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what Hegel means by this claim: A rose is not an individual rose by virtue of

exemplifying the abstract universal ‘red’, whereas it is an individual rose by

virtue of exemplifying the concrete universal ‘rose’ – so the latter is

dialectically related to individuality in the way the former is not; and it

exempliﬁes the abstract universal ‘red’ in the same way as other red things,

whereas it exempliﬁes the concrete universal ‘rose’ diﬀerently from other

roses, in so far as some roses are scented and others are not, some are

evergreen and others are not, etc. – so the latter is dialectically related to

particularity in the way the former is not. Thus, whereas it may appear that

we can conceive of ‘red’ in abstraction from individuality and particularity,

we cannot conceive of ‘rose’ in this manner, so that this kind of universality

involves ‘the totality of the Concept’ (i.e. the other ‘moments’ of particularity

and individuality) in the way that an abstract universal does not.

Taken in this way, Hegel’s position can be viewed as a distinctive

contribution to the metaphysical discussion concerning universals (though

with echoes of other positions in the tradition, particularly Aristotle’s). The

trouble with abstract universals like ‘red’, Hegel argues, is that instances of

such universals are not individuals in themselves, so that individuals are

reduced to ‘bundles’ of such universals, while diﬃculties in individuating

these bundles lead to the ‘substratum’ view of objects: but because this

substratum is ‘bare’ (i.e. property-less), it is hard to see how it can do the

individuating job required of it. However, if we recognize that there are also

concrete universals such as ‘man’, we will avoid these problems: for, while

instances of ‘red’ are not individuals, instances of substa nce universals such

as ‘man’ are; but for this to be the case, it must be possible to exemplify a

universal such as ‘man’ in many diﬀerent ways, such that each of us can be

a man uniquely, in a way that constitutes our individuality. Hegel thus oﬀers

a way of solving the problem of individuation, without appealing either to

the idea of a ‘bare individual’ or to trope theory (according to which the

universal as it is instantiated in diﬀerent individuals is not identical between

them, but is a distinct particular in each): while there is nothing more to

the individual than the universals it exempliﬁes, those universals are a

combination of property and substance universals, so that it is qua man that

I have the particular set of properties that make me into an individual, not

as a bare ‘this’. Unless we recognize Hegel’s way of drawing a distinction

between abstract and concrete universals, this way of solving the problem is

something we will miss.

Hegel’s doctrine of the concrete universal may therefore be summarize d as

follows: the individual is no more than an instantiation of universals (there

are no ‘bare’ individuals); but the universals that constitute the individual

are not just property universals, as these just tell us what attributes the

individual has, not what the individual is (so the ‘bundle view’ is false). The

substance universals which constitute the nature of the individual qua

individual do not exist in the abstract, but only as particularized through

property universals, and thus as instantiated in the form of individuals

132 ROBERT STERN

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