It seems that Bradley is arguing here that a universal such as ‘red-hairedness’
may appear to be an abstract universal, in the sense that no internal relation
may seem to hold between all the different individuals that have red hair; but
then in fact the universal is concrete, because by exemplifying the same
universal, each red-haired individual is internally related to each other red-
haired individual within a totality.
Clearly, a proper assessment of this conception of the concrete universal
would require a much broader analysis of the philosophical position that
goes with it, such as Bradley’s view of relations; and that cannot be
undertaken here. We can, however, raise the interpretative question: how far
does this holistic conception of the concrete universal present a plausible
way of understanding the position ad opted by Hegel?
A first, and most obvious, difference between Hegel’s position and the
Bradleyean one, is that Hegel does seem to allow that the concrete universal
is a type of universal, rather than claiming that all universals are in fact
concrete. For example, Hegel says that the property ‘red’ is ‘an abstract
universal’ (‘ein abstrakt Allgemeines’),
27
and he contrasts this with a
property like ‘good’. Therefore, even if Hegel does believe that some
universals can be viewed holistically as ‘embracing’ individuals into a
‘concrete whole’, he would not appear to believe that all universals can be so
viewed, contra Brad ley.
More substa ntively, perhaps, we can also raise doubts about whether
Hegel has this holistic conception of the concrete universal at all. That this
was Hegel’s conception is widely held, not least by the Idealists themselves.
Thus, Royce writes in his exposition of what he takes to be Hegel’s view:
The universal of the understanding, applying to a nature which is only
exemplified by each individual, and which exists nowhere but in such
individual examples (as animality exists only in individual animals), tells us
nothing about the interrelationship of the individuals themselves, gives us
therefore no Einheit des Begriffes
28
...Das Wahre ist konkret means for [Hegel]
equally, ‘The truth is an organic union of interrelated aspects, characters,
qualities’, and ‘The truth is the Universal in which the particulars and
individuals are organically joined’.
29
The Anglo-American Idealists therefore saw in Hegel a fellow holist, and
treated his doctrine of the concrete uni versal as central to his holism, as it
was to theirs. It seems to me, however, that this puts Hegel’s own conception
of the concrete universal in the wrong light.
27
Hegel, Encyclopaedia Logic, x172 Addition, p. 250 (translation modified) (Werke, Vol. VIII,
p. 324).
28
Royce, The Spirit of Modern Philosophy, 495.
29
Ibid., 500.
HEGEL AND THE CONCRETE UNIVERSAL 125
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